Delinquency Case Law

In re Arturo D. (Jan. 24, 2002) 27 Cal.4th 60 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 581]. Supreme Court of California. (This case was consolidated with People v. Hinger.)

The juvenile court adjudged a youth a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section for violating Health and Safety Code section 11364 (possession of an opium pipe) and Vehicle Code section 12500(a) (driving without a license). The youth was pulled over by a police officer for traveling 70 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour speed zone. The youth admitted that he lacked a valid driver's license and provided no identification, proof of insurance, or vehicle registration. The officer asked the youth and the two passengers to exit the truck and then proceeded from the front of the truck to feel under the driver's seat for documentation relating to the driver and the truck. The officer then went behind the driver's seat and bent down to look under it. He found a smoking pipe and blue box that held a white vial containing white powder. The youth admitted to the officer that the items were his and provided the officer with his name, address, and birthdate. The officer issued a citation for speeding and driving without a license and arranged to have the vehicle towed because there was no licensed driver. The youth accompanied the officer to the police station to call for a ride home. At the station the officer learned that the substance in the vial was methamphetamine, and the child was arrested. The District Attorney later filed a petition alleging violations of Health and Safety Code section 11377(a) (possession of methamphetamine), Health and Safety Code section 11364 (possession of an opium pipe), and Vehicle Code section 12500(a) (driving without a license). At the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court denied the youth's suppression motion and sustained the petition except for the possession of methamphetamine charge because there was insufficient evidence that the vial belonged to the child. The youth appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed the order denying the youth's suppression motion as to the pipe, reasoning that the search, for registration and other identifying documentation, was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal. Under Vehicle Codes sections 4462 and 12951, the person in immediate control of the vehicle is required to present evidence of registration and a driver's license when a police officer requests them. In this case, the youth failed to provide the information after being stopped for a traffic violation, and the police officer proceeded to search the vehicle. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, but it is established that individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy when driving on public thoroughfares. The Supreme Court addressed the question whether, in the context of a valid traffic stop in which a driver fails to produce a driver's license, registration, and other identification, the reduced expectation of privacy consistent with the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to conduct a limited warrantless search for the necessary documents. The Supreme Court honored the juvenile court's finding that the officer was searching for both the youth's registration and license. Although the youth had explained to the officer that he did not have a license, the officer was entitled to enter the vehicle to conduct a limited search.

The youth also argued that the officer had to conduct a limited warrantless search in a traditional repository such as the glove compartment or sun visor. The Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General and found that searches for regulatory documentation are permissible in those locations where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found, including under the driver's seat. There are many decisions that report instances of driver's wallets or identification found under the seat, sometimes placed there in an effort to hide the driver's identity. The Supreme Court determined that it was reasonable for the officer to view the area underneath the seat. It agreed with the Attorney General that the police officer may reasonably search and more easily view underneath the seat from looking behind it.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court rejected the youth's argument that the search was unreasonable because the nature and quality of the intrusion on his Fourth Amendment interests outweighed the importance of the government's interest alleged to justify the intrusion. The officer's decision to conduct the limited search was reasonable, and the contraband discovered in plain view was properly obtained. The juvenile court properly denied the suppression motion and the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the judgment.

Justice Werdeger concurred with the majority in that warrantless searches of traditional repositories for proof of registration is authorized, but dissented from the holding that the space underneath the driver's seat is a traditional repository for a registration document. She also dissented from the majority's holding that an officer can constitutionally search a vehicle for a driver's license because the officer has other options for obtaining the driver's identity, such as running a computer search, having the driver submit a thumbprint, accepting another type of identification, or arresting the driver. Justices Kennard and Brown dissented, stating that the majority's decision runs counter to the high court's decision in Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113 and that there is "no justification for the warrantless, nonconsensual search of a car's interior when the officer has made no arrest and the officer lacks probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband."