Delinquency Case Law

In re Johnny M. (Aug. 5, 2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 316]. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8.

The juvenile court ordered a youth, who was declared a ward of the court, to pay restitution to the Downey Unified School District after the youth admitted that he damaged school property. The youth came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 when he entered a middle school, along with three other juveniles, on two occasions with the intent to commit larceny. At the dispositional hearing the minor admitted to the allegations of larceny in order to participate in the deferred entry of judgment program. The youth was declared a ward of the court pursuant to section 602 and ordered confined for a period not to exceed three years, eight months. Entry of judgment was deferred and the minor was placed on probation, during which he was allowed to live at home. The terms of probation included a provision requiring the youth to make reparation on "all related losses as determined by the Probation Officer." Several days before the dispositional hearing, the youth was expelled from school because his mother could not afford to pay $1,745, the prorated portion of restitution requested by the school district. At the youth's request, a restitution hearing was set. At this hearing the director of maintenance for the school district testified that after investigating the two burglaries, he concluded that the school's total losses were $3,071, which included changing the locks and keys of the classrooms, overtime payment to custodians, and payments to salaried employees for cleanup work. The juvenile court found the school's loss to be at least $3,071.14, observing that the school spent over $3,000 in "just man-labor and part costs" alone. Therefore, the court held that the school district was entitled to restitution in the amount of $3,071.14, plus any additional amounts for damaged or stolen items as determined by the probation officer. The court also ordered the probation officer to determine the youth's prorated share of this amount.

The youth appealed the decision of the juvenile court, arguing that the court's restitution order improperly included costs other than out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the district and, therefore, the order was not authorized under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6. The youth argued that payments based on the number of hours worked on cleanup by salaried employees and the pro rata share of the benefits that these employees are entitled to were improperly included in the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the juvenile court, stating that section 730.6's mandate that restitution be ordered for all "economic losses" permits reimbursement for such labor costs. The appellate court emphasized that section 730.6(a)(1) states that a victim should receive restitution for "any economic loss" incurred as a result of the minor's conduct. Furthermore, the court pointed out that section 730.6(h) states that each victim should be reimbursed for all determined "economic losses" incurred as a result of the minor's conduct. Indicating that the standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion, the appellate court held that the plain meaning of the statute contradicts the minor's argument that restitution should be limited to out-of-pocket expenses. The court reasoned that under section 730.6, the governing test is "economic losses," not "monies expended." Furthermore, the appellate court asserted that both Proposition 8 and "extensive case authority" indicate that restitution statutes are to be construed broadly and liberally. Particularly, the court found the Dalvito case, (1997) 56 Cal.App4th 557, instructive. In Dalvito, the Court of Appeal ruled that the victim need not demonstrate out-of-pocket losses to qualify for a restitution award. Therefore, the appellate court adopted an expansive interpretation of "economic losses" under section 730.6, concluding that "a restitution order may also properly include the reasonable value of employee work product lost as a result of the criminal conduct of another, be that person a minor or adult." The appellate court reasoned that any other rule would encourage victims to incur out-of-pocket expenses rather than try to repair damage to property in house, which would be problematic due to the unlikelihood of their actually receiving reimbursement from a criminal defendant.

The appellate court also distinguished the case of People v. Friscia (18 Cal.App4th 834), which the youth relied upon, stating that Friscia was different because it involved restitution that was expressly defined in former Penal Code section 1203.04. The court noted that section 730.6, which applies to the youth's case, does not expressly define restitution but instead calls for compensating the victim for all "economic losses" incurred. Furthermore, the appellate court indicated that section 730.6(a)(1) uses the word "including" before the list of kinds of economic losses that a victim can be reimbursed for. The court asserted that this use of the word "including" expressed the Legislature's intention to not limit the court to the kinds of losses specified and to allow the court broad discretion to determine the victim's economic losses. Therefore, the appellate court held that the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in granting the school restitution for the labor costs of salaried employees who repaired the damages caused by the youth. The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's decision, awarding the school restitution in the amount of $3,071.14, plus any additional amounts for damaged or stolen items as determined by the probation officer.