Delinquency Case Law

In re Tino V, (Aug. 22, 2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 510 [124 Cal. Rptr.2d 312]. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6.

The juvenile court committed a youth to the California Youth Authority (CYA) and extended his sentence until the age of 25. The juvenile court had sustained a Welfare and Institutions code section 602 petition and found the youth guilty of committing two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. The youth was 14 years old when he committed the offenses. The court then placed the youth on probation in the custody of his parents. After the youth failed to reform during probation, the court committed him to the CYA for a maximum period of five years and six months. The court decided that assault with a deadly weapon is listed in Welfare and Institutions code section 707 and that the CYA's jurisdiction extended over the youth until age 25. The youth appealed the juvenile court's decision, arguing that the court was not authorized to commit him to the CYA until the age of 25 because he was only 14 when he committed the offenses. The youth conceded that his offenses are listed in section 707(b), but indicated that section 707(b) applies to minors 16 years of age or older. The youth argued that because section 1769(b) (describing Department of Youth Authority discharge) refers to section 707(b), the extended CYA commitment must also apply only to minors 16 years of age or older and therefore, must not apply to him.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the juvenile court, authorizing the youth's commitment to the CYA until the age of 25. The appellate court stated that both section 607(b) (describing retention of jurisdiction) and 1769(b) refer to the offenses in section 707(b) only to designate the offenses that trigger extended commitments. Both sections 607 and 1769 refer to section 602, but they do not refer to section 707's 16-year age requirement. Section 602(a) applies to any person under the age of 18. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that since the youth was 14 when he committed the offenses, he fell within section 1769 and section 607. The appellate court reasoned that in interpreting section 607(b), the court in In re Julian O. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 847, indicated that the Legislature intended to extend the scope of section 607 to minors of all ages. The In re Julian court noted that section 607 previously applied only to older minors, but that the Legislature amended it in 1982 to eliminate the language restricting the statute's application to minors 16 or older. Furthermore, In re Julian asserted that section 707(b) "has nothing to do with commitments to the CYA" and that its purpose is instead to list offenses that, when committed, "trigger a presumption that the minor is unfit to be dealt with under the juvenile court law." The appellate court adopted In re Julian's interpretation of section 607 and indicated that this reasoning also applied to section 1769. Accordingly, the court rejected the youth's argument that In re Julian was inapposite because the appellate court did not review section 1769, which has a different purpose and result than section 607. Quoting the legislative history, the appellate court in this case concluded that section 607 and 1769 were amended to " 'delete the language limiting the application of the provision to persons who were 16 years of age or older at the time of the offense' and to increase the juvenile court's retention of jurisdiction and CYA commitments to age 25." The appellate court held that the juvenile court properly applied sections 607 and 1769. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's order committing the youth to the CYA until the age of 25 in accordance with section 1769(b).