Delinquency Case Law

In re Oscar R. (Sept. 12, 2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1370 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 269]. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2.

The juvenile court revoked a youth's probation and sentenced him to commitment at the California Youth Authority (CYA) under the authority of Welfare and Institutions Code section 777. The youth had been charged with three counts of robbery and one count of possession of a firearm by a minor. The juvenile court had sustained the petition on two counts of robbery and possession of a firearm and ordered that the youth to be placed in the camp community placement program (camp) for a period not to exceed 16 years. Additionally, as a condition of probation, the youth was ordered to avoid contact with the robbery victims. The youth was charged two times with public intoxication. After the second conviction for public intoxication, the juvenile court sentenced the youth to two months at the CYA, and the matter was continued for a contested disposition and a probation violation hearing. During the hearing, the probation officer testified that victim told him that the youth had made a threatening call to the victim, telling the victim to "watch his back." Based on this evidence, the juvenile court held that the youth's contact with the victim in violation of the probation order (for the original offense) was of serious concern and warranted a more restrictive placement. Therefore, the juvenile court revoked the youth's placement in camp and sentenced the youth to the CYA (based on the probation violation). The youth appealed the juvenile court's decision, arguing that the court's application of section 777 violated the ex post facto clause of the U.S. and California constitutions, the juvenile court erred in admitting hearsay testimony, and amended section 777 violated California's single-subject rule.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The youth argued that the juvenile court's application of section 777 violated the ex post facto clause because the original underlying offense occurred before enactment of the statute. The appellate court rejected the youth's argument, stating that the ex post facto clause would only be violated if all relevant events occurred before the enactment of amended section 777. The appellate court held that the ex post facto clause was not violated because the youth violated the terms of his probation one year after the enactment of amended section 777. Furthermore, the appellate court stated that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the "reliable hearsay testimony" of the probation officer. The court noted that for hearsay evidence to be admissible at a probation revocation hearing the evidence must be reliable and may be admitted only for "good cause." The appellate court asserted that the testimony about the victim's statements was reliable because the probation officer had described that this was supported by a written report indicating the date he met with the victim and the mother. In addition, the court held that there was "good cause" to admit the hearsay testimony because the victim's presence at the hearing would have exposed the victim to a risk of harm. Finally, the appellate court rejected the youth's argument that amended section 777 violates California's single-subject rule, indicating that in Manduley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, the California Supreme Court held that amended section 777 satisfies the requirements of that rule. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's decision ordering the youth to be committed to the CYA under the authority of amended section 777.