Delinquency Case Law

In re Michele D. (Dec. 16, 2002) 29 Cal.App.4th 600 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92]. Supreme Court of California.

The juvenile court sustained a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 against the youth for kidnapping a child in violation of Penal Code section 207(a). After suffering from a miscarriage, the youth went shopping with a friend and the friend’s child. While the child was in her possession, the youth took the child outside the store and fled without the friend’s permission. The juvenile court sustained the petition against the youth and recommended that the youth be confined at a juvenile facility with special expertise in counseling troubled adolescents; the youth’s maximum period of confinement was set at 13 years. The youth appealed the juvenile court’s decision, arguing that in the absence of any proof that she had forcibly seized the child the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction under Penal Code section 207.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s decision and held that the abduction of a nonresistant infant or child without knowledge or permission of the parent constitutes kidnapping. The appellate court reasoned that even though “force,” commonly defined as physical restraint, violence, or compulsion, was not used, the conclusion remains unaltered because it is inconceivable that the Legislature intended the physical taking of an infant in the manner described by these facts to not constitute the crime of kidnapping.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision and held that (1) the only force required to support a kidnapping conviction of an infant or child is the amount necessary to move the victim a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent; (2) a statutory affirmative defense to kidnapping, under which the defendant may claim the child taken was in danger of imminent harm, did not overrule or abrogate the requirement that the state must prove the defendant’s illegal purpose or intent as an element of the kidnapping crime; and (3) the evidence supported the state’s charge against the youth for kidnapping. First, the Supreme Court reasoned that even if force, as conventionally understood, was not used to conduct the kidnapping, the youth’s intent in carrying off the infant still renders her conduct kidnapping. The Supreme Court further reasoned that it is generally settled that the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences not intended by the Legislature. The Supreme Court also emphasized that in the analogous case of People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761 the Supreme Court suggested that the force requirement should be eliminated or relaxed when the victim is an infant or small child. Second, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Penal Code section 207(e)(1) defense to kidnapping for a defendant who takes a child in danger of imminent harm does not overrule the statute’s “illegal purpose or intent” requirement because the defense is not inconsistent with the intent requirement. Third, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence supported the youth’s conviction for kidnapping because the evidence indicates that the youth had the illegal intent or purpose to take the child without permission. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision upholding the youth’s conviction for kidnapping pursuant to Penal Code section 207.