Delinquency Case Law

In re Omar R. (Feb. 5, 2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1434 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 912]. Court of Appeal, Third District.

Following the child's violation of informal probation, the juvenile court sustained a delinquency petition based upon the child's admission that he had possessed marijuana, declared him a ward of the court, and placed him on probation.

The juvenile court first denied the child's motion to suppress evidence of marijuana found on his person (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1) It then accepted the child's admission to a charge of possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(a)) in exchange for the child's agreement to complete a six-month informal supervision program. At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court found that the child had violated conditions of his informal supervision. Therefore, it sustained the delinquency petition based upon the child's admission that he had possessed marijuana and placed him on probation. On appeal, the child contended that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his informal probation because (1) it failed to follow the procedures set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2, and (2) the earlier notice of appeal challenging the denial of the suppression motion precluded the juvenile court from taking further action in the case. He also argued that reversal was required because the juvenile court wrongfully denied his suppression motion. The People conceded that remand was required because of the juvenile court's failure to comply with section 654.2.

The Court of Appeal concluded that, while the juvenile court did exceed its jurisdiction by placing the child on informal probation subsequent to accepting his admission of the charges, the child was estopped from asserting the error. With the consent of the child and the child's parents or guardian, the juvenile court may continue a hearing on a petition to declare the child a ward of the court for six months and allow the child the option of completing a program of supervision (§ 654.2). If the child successfully completes the program of supervision, the petition is dismissed. (Ibid.) However, even though the informal supervision program is available post-petition, the juvenile court cannot adjudicate the allegations in the petition until after the child fails to satisfactorily complete the informal supervision program. (In re Adam R. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 348, 352-353.) The juvenile court cannot make true findings on allegations in the petition and then order an informal supervision program under section 654.2. (Id. at p. 353.) Therefore, the appellate court concluded that because the juvenile court adjudicated the petition by accepting the child's admission to the charge, it exceeded its jurisdiction by then placing the child on informal probation pursuant to section 654.2.

It further concluded, however, that the child was estopped from claiming such error. When a court has jurisdiction of the subject, a litigant who has stipulated to a procedure in excess of the court's power may be estopped to later claim that the ensuing action was in excess of jurisdiction. (In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d. 343, 347-348.) The determination depends upon considerations of public policy and whether allowing the challenge would permit the litigant to "trifle with the courts." (Ibid.) The appellate court reasoned that the child was not prejudiced by the juvenile court's failure to comply with section 654.2 because it was clear that the possession charge would be sustained once the child's suppression motion was denied. At the suppression hearing, the arresting police officer testified that, during his pat down of the child, the child admitted that he had marijuana in his rear pocket and gave the officer permission to remove the package. Therefore, in denying the suppression motion, the juvenile court expressly found the officer's version of the events credible. Moreover, since the juvenile court violated section 654.2 by placing the child on informal probation, it was not the irregularity of deviating from the statute that allegedly prejudiced the child. Rather, the child was harmed by his failure to successfully complete the grant of informal supervision, which, had he been successful, would have resulted in the dismissal of the petition. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that allowing the child to challenge the plea agreement after having obtained its benefit would allow the child to "trifle with the court."

The appellate court further concluded that the child's notice of appeal challenging the denial of his suppression motion did not divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction to proceed to disposition. It noted that pending the resolution of an appeal, the trial court retains jurisdiction to supervise a probationer and to punish violations of any probationary conditions. The appellate court also rejected the child's contention that the juvenile court wrongfully denied his suppression motion, a contention that it had previously rejected in a nonpublished opinion. Therefore, the juvenile court's decision to sustain the delinquency petition was affirmed.