Delinquency Case Law

In re Joseph F. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 975 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 641]. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5.

The juvenile court declared a child a ward of the court and placed him on probation after determining that he had committed battery on a police officer and resisted arrest. (Pen. Code, §§ 148(a), 243(b).)

The middle school's assistant principal and the school district's police resource officer were in a meeting when they noticed the child and a friend outside, near some classrooms. After the police officer recognized the children as students of a nearby high school, the assistant principal went to investigate. The assistant principal sought help from the officer. The police officer, who was wearing a uniform and badge, approached the boys and asked them to stop. The child yelled profanities and continued walking away. The officer attempted to apply an armlock, and a struggle ensued. After the child escaped and again began to walk away, the officer applied handcuffs. School hours at that middle school end at 1:40 p.m., although after-school activities may extend past 3:00 p.m. Penal Code section 627.2 requires a visitor to register with the principal or authorized designee during school hours. The child had not registered as a visitor when he was found on school grounds at approximately 3:00 p.m. The child argued that he was on school grounds because he was accompanying his friend to give the friend's little brother a house key, that he did not know who the assistant principal was when the latter approached them, that he was on his way home after being told to leave by a female campus monitor, and that he did not know that the man who grabbed him was an officer. The child appealed the decision of the juvenile court sustaining a petition of battery and resisting arrest.

The Court of Appeal, in a partially published opinion, affirmed the decision of the juvenile court. The child argued on appeal that the officer was not engaged in the lawful performance of duties when the officer approached him. In order for a person to be convicted of the aforementioned offenses, the officer must have acted reasonably and lawfully. The officer argued that he was acting in his capacity to provide a safe and secure environment for the district's schools as provided by the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(c).) Penal Code section 626.7 provides that if it reasonably appears to an officer that a person has entered the campus to commit or is committing an act likely to interfere with the peaceful conduct of the school's activities, then the officer may ask the person to leave, and failure to comply is a misdemeanor. In this case, the officer had the right to detain the child and inquire who he was and why he was on the school's grounds after the assistant principal had requested assistance. Given the child's escalating resistance to the officer, the officer had acted reasonably. The appellate court noted that school officials need not articulate a specific crime that may be about to take place in order to detain an outsider on campus. In addition, school officials are authorized to compel outsiders who have no legitimate purpose for being on school grounds to leave, regardless of school registration hours.

The child also argued that there was insufficient evidence of battery. He argued that the officer had used excessive force and he himself had acted in self-defense. The appellate court concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the officer had used excessive force. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court and sustained the battery and resisting-arrest petition.

Justice Barbara J. R. Jones, in a dissenting opinion, asserted that there was insufficient evidence that the officer had acted lawfully at the time of the offense. Justice Jones stated that there was no reasonable basis for the officer to detain someone on suspicion of violating statutes pertaining to trespassing on a school campus without registering. Both parties testified that the child was in the parking lot, leaving school grounds, when the incident occurred. In addition, there was no evidence that the child was going to interfere with the peaceful conduct of school activities; there is no local ordinance that forbids nonstudents to be on school grounds after school hours; and no criminal activity was afoot. Justice Jones contended that the Constitution and the Education and Penal Codes do not trump Fourth Amendment protections by creating a "special needs" administrative search-and-seizure exception in public schools, especially when, as in this case, the investigative stop is uncontested and unlawful.