Delinquency Case Law

In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 10]. Court of Appeal, Fifth District.

The juvenile court adjudged a child a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.

The child was charged with two counts of violating Penal Code section 422.6(b), two counts of vandalism under Penal Code section 594(a), and one count of possession of tools to commit graffiti or vandalism under section 594.2. The child used a marker to write a racial epithet on the classroom door of the only African-American teacher at the school and also wrote a threatening expression the music building, in an area where African-American students regularly convened. The child admitted to writing these words when the police detective told the child that he would play a videotape of the commissions recorded by the school cameras. The child stated that he did not like African Americans because they bullied him. The child appealed the decision of the juvenile court on the ground that the classroom door and the building were not the property of the victims as interpreted under section 422.6(b).

The Court of Appeal, in a partially published opinion, affirmed the decision of the juvenile court. Section 422.6(b) provides, in pertinent part, that "no person . . . shall knowingly deface, damage, or destroy the real or personal property of any other person for the purpose of intimidating or interfering with the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to the other person by the [state or U.S.] Constitution, …because of the other's person's race." The child argued that the school door and the pillar were the property of the school and not of the victims. The child contended that the phrase "property of any other person" requires that the victim own the defaced or destroyed property.

The appellate court determined that section 422.6(b) does not expressly require any particular ownership interest in the property. The statute does require some connection between the property that has been defaced or destroyed and the person who has been targeted because of race, color, religion, or some other bias. The statute provides for the prevention of intimidation and of interference with another's civil rights, when the intimidation or interference is based on the other's actual or perceived protected characteristic. The appellate court noted that if the child's narrow interpretation of the statute (that the property must be owned by the victim) were applied, the purpose of the statute might be frustrated. The appellate court determined that if property is regularly and openly used, possessed, or occupied by the victim so that it is readily identifiable with that person, it falls within the scope of section 422.6(b).

The appellate court determined that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude in this case that a classroom regularly and openly used by the only African-American teacher was identifiable with her and could be considered her property. The child admitted that he knew the African-American teacher taught in that particular room. Therefore, the statute was appropriately applied as to the teacher. The appellate court also concluded that the statute was appropriately applied as to the African-American students because a reasonable trier of fact could determine that the area by the music building where the words were written was regularly and openly occupied by the students so as to be identifiable with them.

The appellate court also determined that the trial court's interpretation of section 422.6(b) did not violate the child's First Amendment rights. The child argued that his words did not constitute a credible threat of violence and thus he was entitled to First Amendment protection. The appellate court noted that conduct such as vandalism is not protected by the First Amendment merely by expressing an idea: "The statute is directed at regulating conduct that is unprotected by the first amendment." The child argued that since the words were written on school property, they were nothing more than graffiti and not meant to attack the victims personally. The appellate court rejected this argument and determined that the word written on the teacher's door carried with it a violent connotation since it produced fear in the teacher. Also, the expression on the pillar could be reasonably interpreted as a direct violent threat to the African-American students who congregated by the music building. The appellate court therefore affirmed the decision of the juvenile court.