Delinquency Case Law

In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 165]. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4.

The juvenile court adjudged a child a ward of the court for violating Penal Code section 422 (making a terrorist threat). The 16-year-old child had left the classroom to use the bathroom. When he returned the door was locked. The teacher opened the door and hit the child on the head. The youth was angry and said to the teacher, “I’m going to get you.” The teacher, feeling physically threatened, sent him to the office. The youth did not make any further act of aggression or any specific threats. An officer interviewed the youth the following day, and the youth admitted to “getting in the teacher’s face” and saying he would “kick the teacher’s ass,” but he claimed he did not mean to sound threatening. The youth understood his actions were not appropriate and apologized. He never made any physical gestures toward the teacher. The juvenile court sustained the Welfare and Institutions Code 602 petition. The youth appealed, claiming that there was insufficient evidence for the court to find that he had violated Penal Code section 422.

The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the juvenile court. In order to sustain a finding that a terrorist threat was made in violation of Penal Code section 422, the People were required to show that: (1) the youth willfully threatened to commit a crime that would result in death or bodily injury; (2) the threat was made with the specific intent to be taken as a threat; (3) the threat on its face was unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific enough to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat; and (4) the threat caused the person threatened to have reasonably sustained fear for their own safety. The youth conceded the first two elements, but argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish the latter two elements. The appellate court noted that threats are judged in context and that the People relied too much on the words spoken. There was no immediacy to the threat as the police were not called until the next day. There also was no evidence that the youth and the teacher had any prior history of disagreements or had expressed offensive remarks to each other. The appellate court stated that, in this case, the words were not accompanied by any physical violence such as pushing or shoving. The court noted, “If surrounding circumstances within the meaning of section 422 can show whether a terrorist threat was made, absence of circumstances can also show that a terrorist threat was not made within the meaning of section 422.” In this case there was no evidence of any circumstances after the youth’s “threats” that would further a terrorist threat finding.

Also, the term “sustained fear” was interpreted by the appellate court to mean “time that extends beyond what is momentary, fleeting, or transitory.” There was no evidence in this case that the fear the teacher had was more than fleeting or transitory. The youth went to the school office and returned the next day to meet the officer; he did not take advantage of the teacher’s fear. The youth’s statements were an emotional response to an incident rather than a terrorist threat that induced sustained fear. Students who are confrontational or misbehave should be taught a lesson, “but not, as in this case, a penal one.” The appellate court reversed the decision of the juvenile court. .