Delinquency Case Law

In re Walter S. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 946 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 752]. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2.

The juvenile court adjudged a youth a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for possessing a sawed-off shotgun (Pen. Code, § 12020(a)(1)) for the benefit or in association with a criminal street gang with the intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1)). Two male youths pointed a gun at and ordered a victim out of his car. The victim’s wallet and car were taken. Later, the youth got into the car to go cruising with many of his gang members. This gang has about 200 members and is involved in many violent crimes including robberies, murders, and carjackings. Some of the gang members got out of the victim’s car, and the youth in the instant case and the driver were seen by a police officer. The officer made a U-turn to stop the car because the youths were not wearing seatbelts. The driver sped through a stop sign, stopped the car, and the two youths ran out of the car. The officer noticed a sawed-off shotgun on the passenger’s side, which was there prior to the youth getting into the car. The gun did not belong to the youth in the instant case. The safety was off the gun and there were two “.00 shotgun rounds”, which are extremely powerful, in the chamber. The youth was arrested, and he admitted to knowing that the car was taken by his fellow gang members. The juvenile court declared the youth a ward of the court for possessing a shotgun and for acting in furtherance of a gang’s criminal conduct. The youth appealed, contending that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the youth possessed a shotgun with the specific intent to promote criminal conduct by a gang; (2) Penal Code section 186.32(a)(10)(C), requiring that a juvenile registering as a gang offender must give “any information that may be required by the law enforcement agency,” is unconstitutionally vague; (3) this Penal Code provision is also overbroad; (4) the registration requirement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (5) the registration order and use of the gang enhancement to calculate the maximum period of confinement is multiple punishment in violation of Penal Code section 654; and (6) the juvenile court erred in ordering the youth to pay restitution to the victim.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the juvenile court noting, however, that the juvenile court erred in ordering the youth to pay restitution to the victim. The appellate court found that there was substantial evidence to find that the youth had possessed the gun to promote, further, and assist the criminal conduct of gang members. The youth was holding the gun between his legs while riding around in a car that he knew had been carjacked earlier that day.

Penal Code section 186.32(a)(10)(C), added by Proposition 21, provides that when a juvenile registers as a gang offender, there must be a “written statement signed by the juvenile giving any information that may be required by the law enforcement agency, submitted to the law enforcement agency.” The youth argued that the requirement of “any” information to be provided to the law enforcement agency is vague and may permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The appellate court compared the statute to other registration statutes for sex offenders, arsonists, and narcotics offenders. The appellate court interpreted the information described in section 186.32(a)(10)(C) as information necessary to locate the juvenile, such as his or her full name, aliases, date of birth, residence, description and license plate number of any car the person drives, and any information regarding employment. Construed this way, the statute is not subject to any arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. The youth also argued that the statute is overbroad as it infringes on the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the right of privacy, and it threatens the privilege against self-incrimination. The appellate court found that the statute did not have any of these defects.

Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment if it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. Three techniques to determine if a punishment is cruel or unusual are: (1) an examination of the nature of the offense and the offender; (2) a comparison of the challenged penalty with punishments for more serious offenses; and (3) a comparison of the challenged penalty with punishments for the same offense in other jurisdictions. The youth in this case was in possession of a sawed-off shotgun with the safety off and two extremely powerful rounds in the chamber, riding with fellow gang members, in a car he knew to have been taken during a car-jacking. The appellate court found that the requirement for the youth to register as a gang offender does not shock the conscience or offend notions of human dignity.

Penal Code section 654 provides that an act or omission that is punishable by different provisions of law must be punished for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but must not be punished under more than one provision. Penal Code section 186.30 was determined by the appellate court to be an exception to section 654 because under Proposition 21 (where gang-related felonies are subject to severe penalties), the voters intended the registration requirement to be in addition to the imposition of enhancements for gang-related offenses. Therefore, the appellate court held that any person convicted of, or with a wardship petition sustained for, committing a crime with an enhancement allegation under Penal Code section 186.22(b) found to be true, must register as a gang offender under section 186.30 as an exception to Penal Code section 654.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6(a)(1) requires that a juvenile offender pay restitution to a victim who has incurred any economic loss due to the offender’s conduct. Because the youth in this case was not charged with stealing the victim’s car or with committing any other crime against the victim, the juvenile court erred in ordering him to pay restitution. The appellate court affirmed the wardship order and modified the dispositional order to strike the restitution payment requirement.