Delinquency Case Law

Vidal Bravo v. Superior Court of Kern County (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 88 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 514]. Court of Appeal, Fifth District.

After a criminal preliminary hearing, the district attorney filed a four count information alleging that the child and two co-defendants had violated Penal Code section 187(a) (murder). The first count alleged that the child murdered the victim intentionally, in furtherance and for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and that he was 16 years of age. The second and third counts charged the child with the attempted murders of two other individuals and also alleged firearm, drive-by shooting, and criminal street gang charges, as well as eligibility for direct filing in adult court. The fourth count alleged that the child had unlawfully carried a handgun for the benefit of and in association with a criminal street gang. Also, the child had committed a felony at age 14 and was found to be a ward at that time. The child appealed under Penal Code section 995, alleging that Proposition 21 (a voter initiative that amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d) to provide the district attorney with the discretion to file certain criminal charges against youths in either adult or juvenile court): (1) violates the single-subject rule; (2) violates the separation of powers doctrine because the executive branch improperly wields judicial power; (3) improperly altered the text of the statute; and (4) violates equal protection laws. A child co-defendant also joined the petition.

The Court of Appeal rejected the challenges and denied the petitions for writ of prohibition. The appellate court first recognized that it was not the first court to address the constitutionality of Proposition 21, and it rejected the decision of the Fourth District in Manduley v. Superior Court (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1198, in which the proposition was deemed unconstitutional. The Fifth District determined that Prop. 21 did not violate the single-subject rule. The child in the instant case contended that the proposition violated article II, section 8(d) of California’s Constitution because it embraced more than “one subject.” A proposition complies with the single-subject rule if its parts are “reasonably germane” to each other. The petitioners did not point to any portion of the proposition that could not be determined as reasonably germane to the proposition’s goal of reducing juvenile and gang-related crime. The appellate court noted that just because the proposition “shifts gears,” that does not constitute constitutional invalidity. The appellate court determined that even the provisions that amended portions of the three-strikes law were germane and not intended to trick the voters into goals unrelated to the initiative. Also, the initiative process is a power reserved by the people, not granted to them, and the court must preserve this power if doubts can reasonably be resolved.

The bulk of the opinion in this case is dedicated to a separation of powers discussion. The appellate court noted that the legislative branch has the responsibility and power to define criminal charges, the executive branch decides what crime to charge, and the judicial branch imposes sentence within the legislatively determined limits for a particular crime. The separation of powers doctrine mandates that a statute may not constitutionally require the consent of one branch for the proper exercise of another branch’s power, unless it is specified by the federal Constitution. The amended section 707(d) permits a prosecutor to either directly file charges against juvenile offenders in adult court or to file charges in juvenile court. Prior to the passage of Prop. 21, the prosecutor would bring proceedings in juvenile court. Under no circumstances was the prosecutor given the discretion to unilaterally decide whether or not to proceed in adult court in a case involving a juvenile offender. The petitioners argue that the removal of the option for the juvenile court to sentence a child under juvenile laws violates the separation of powers doctrine because sentencing is a judicial function. The People argue that because the discretionary filing decision is made before the charges are brought before the court, it is a function of the executive branch.

The appellate court concluded that section 707(d) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The appellate court noted that “there is no constitutional right to the juvenile justice system” and the electorate should be able to place reasonable limitations on that system. The limitation is reasonable because it is not clear if the power provided in section 707(d) is a judicial or executive function. The appellate court noted that it must not interfere unless a statute clearly and unmistakably appears to be unconstitutional. Because each of the branches has exercised all three kinds of powers, and because the juvenile justice system is statutory in nature, the statute is not violative of the federal Constitution. The appellate court distinguished a line of relevant cases that the petitioners cited, because in those cases, the challenged statutory provision purported to give the prosecutor the right to veto a decision made by a court after the criminal charges had already been filed. (See People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248; Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119). Section 707(d) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine simply because it affects sentencing. The Legislature and the People by initiative could eliminate the juvenile courts, lower the age of “juvenile” to 14, or mandate that certain charges be brought in adult court; therefore the conclusion that prosecutor has discretion to charge “legislatively dictated crimes under certain legislatively dictated circumstances in adult court” should not be unconstitutional. The separation of powers doctrine is established to protect individual liberty by preventing the concentration of powers in one branch of government, and section 707(d) does not offend this purpose. The appellate court also found that the proposition’s text was not unconstitutionally altered. The petitioners contended that the proposition circulated for the voters’ signature differed from the proposition that appeared on the ballot. The petitioners failed to provide authority for this constitutional defect, and the appellate court agreed with the People that the variation was due to legislative revisions impacted by the proposition between the time of circulation and election date.

The appellate court also held that the proposition did not violate equal protection principles. Because all juveniles are subject to the prosecutor’s discretion and the potential for abuse (holding unjustifiable standards based on race, religion, or other arbitrary classifications) is no greater than in other charging decisions, the provision does not violate equal protection. The appellate court upheld the constitutionality of Prop. 21, section 26, and denied the petitions for writs of prohibition.