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Delinquency Case Law

In re Michele D. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 600 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 909]. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2.

The juvenile court adjudged a child a ward of the court for violating Penal Code sections 207(a) (kidnapping) and 667.85 (kidnapping a child with the intent to deprive the parent custody of the child).

One year prior to the incident, the child became friendly with the mother and father of an infant. The child was invited to stay with the parents of the infant during difficult times in her life. A few days before the incident, the child suffered a miscarriage. The infant and her mother, along with the child, went to the grocery store to shop together. The child asked the mother to wait for her and the infant as they went to get some additional items, and the mother consented. Approximately an hour later, after searching for the child and the infant, the mother found an empty stroller with the child's purse and the infant's bottle. About one and one- half miles from the grocery store, the child and infant were spotted in a closed area at a car dealership. The mother, after arriving there, identified the child and the infant. The child first stated to the police that she was babysitting, but then said that she had intentionally taken the infant with the hope of raising her herself.

The child presented expert evidence that she was depressed, had a mood disorder, and had other psychological problems caused by the recent miscarriage and by emotional instability. The expert suggested that the child's condition made it impossible for her to rationalize her actions. The child appealed the decision of the juvenile court because the prosecution had failed to prove that the infant was taken by use of force or fear.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the juvenile court. Generally, kidnapping requires proof that the perpetrator used force or fear. All versions of the kidnapping statute, which has existed for over 100 years, use the term "forcibly." The child suggested that because she had not abducted the infant by force or fear, she had committed child abduction under section 278 rather than kidnapping. The appellate court addressed the many definitions of the term "force." The Penal Code provides no consistent interpretation of the term. The child argued that the appropriate definition of the word "force" is akin to the definition of "forcibly" as "effected by force used against opposition or resistance; obtained by compulsion or violence." The appellate court rejected this interpretation of the term and found that taking a child as the infant in this case was taken is a prime example of kidnapping and within the statute's scope. The appellate court held that, to prove a section 207 violation when the victim is an infant or a child, "overcoming resistance is not required and the element of the use of force is satisfied simply by the application of sufficient physical force by the perpetrator to accomplish the unlawful act." The appellate court found that there was substantial evidence in this case that supported the juvenile court's finding that the child had violated section 207(a).