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Dependency
Case Law
In
re S.D. (June 27, 2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068
[121 Cal.Rptr.2d 518]. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3.
The juvenile court
terminated the parental rights of a mother and father under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26. After the mother was arrested and incarcerated
for credit card fraud, neither she nor the father was available to care
for the minor. The father was also incarcerated at the time of the appeal.
There were several relatives available and willing to care for the child.
The juvenile court sustained a dependency petition and obtained jurisdiction
over the child. There was neither an allegation nor evidence that the
mother was unable to arrange for care for the child while she was incarcerated.
The mother successfully completed her case plan, but the court terminated
reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing because the mother
was not released on parole as anticipated. The mother contended on appeal
that the juvenile court lacked a basis to take jurisdiction because she
was able to arrange for care for the minor in the dependency petition
and that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court of Appeal
reversed the judgment of the juvenile court and remanded the case to the
juvenile court with directions to give the social services agency an opportunity
to cure the jurisdictional allegations deficiencies and prove that neither
parent could currently arrange for care for the minor while they are incarcerated.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(g) requires that an incarcerated
parent not only be unable to care for the child but also be unable to
arrange for care. The appellate court found that the fact that the mother
had not already arranged for care by the time of her incarceration to
be irrelevant because the issue was whether, at the time of the jurisdictional
hearing, she could arrange for care. At the time of the jurisdictional
hearing, the record demonstrated that there were several persons available
to care for the child. The appellate court found that the mother's counsel
was ineffective because he misunderstood the statute, conceding incorrectly
that the statute applied to the case and thus failed to oppose the court's
finding the child to be under its jurisdiction. The appellate court found
that, absent any evidence that the mother herself had known of the issue,
the mother had not waived it, and allowed her to raise it for the first
time on appeal. The court found that to deny the mother the right to correct
her counsel's "erroneous concession of the key legal issue"
in spite of the fact that the law and the facts were on her side would
be a deprivation of fundamental fairness and would violate due process.
The appellate court, therefore, reversed the judgment terminating parental
rights and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether,
at the time of remand, there is a basis for amending the dependency pleading
and proving that neither parent is either available to take care of the
child because of incarceration or is unable to arrange for his care for
the remainder of the incarceration period.
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