Dependency Case Law

Rosa S. v. Superior Court of Orange County (Aug. 5, 2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1181 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 866]. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3.

The juvenile court adjudicated the child a dependent of the court, refused to provide the child's mother with reunification services, and set a hearing to select a permanent plan for the child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The child had first been declared a dependent by the juvenile court when she was 15 months old because her mother was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and child endangerment. While the mother was attending a one-year drug treatment and parental education program as part of her probation, the child was placed with her maternal grandfather and his wife. The mother moved into the child's grandparent's home after her release from jail. After 12 months of reunification services, the child was returned to her mother under a plan of family maintenance; 6 months later, the dependency was terminated.

The social services agency (the agency) then filed a petition alleging that the mother had an "unresolved" substance abuse problem, that her whereabouts were unknown at the time, and that she was not available to care for the medical and dental needs of the child. The mother's counsel "submitted" to jurisdiction on a stipulation form, which was received into evidence by the juvenile court. Pursuant to the stipulation form, the court found the allegations to be true and declared the child a ward of the court on the grounds of failure to protect and abandonment. The child's father, who was incarcerated, signed a waiver of his appearance and his default judgment was entered.

At the dispositional hearing, the agency's counsel initialed a stipulation form that proposed that the court adopt the written recommendations of the agency, including a handwritten order that the court find the parents to have received the maximum family reunification services under section 361.5. The form also proposed that the agency " formulate a suitable permanent plan for the minor," and the court set a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26. Both the mother's counsel and the child's counsel did not initial the form. Instead, "request for argument" was written in the space for the child's attorney and "req[uest] cont[inuance] submit" was written in the space for the mother's attorney. The juvenile court denied the request for continuance and made findings pursuant to the agency's proposed stipulation. The court refused to provide the mother with reunification services and set a hearing to select a permanent plan for the child.

The mother appealed the juvenile court's decision, challenging the court's finding under section 300 that she had abandoned and failed to protect her child and arguing that the court denied her family reunification services that she was entitled to receive under section 361.5.

The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court had dependency jurisdiction over the case but had erred by denying the mother reunification services. Therefore, the appellate court granted the respondent's petition in part and ordered the juvenile court to hold a new dispositional hearing. Regarding the mother's challenge to the juvenile court's findings under section 300(b) [failure to protect] and section 300(g) [abandonment], the appellate court dismissed the mother's arguments, stating that the preponderance of the evidence substantiated the abuse and neglect claims against the mother.
The appellate court addressed the mother's serious challenge to the juvenile court's denial of family reunification services under section 361.5. Welfare and Institutions section 361.5(a) provides that whenever a child is removed from a parent's custody, the juvenile court must order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child's mother and statutorily presumed father for a period not to exceed 18 months after the date the child is originally removed from the parents' physical custody. The appellate court rejected the agency's argument that the mother should not receive a new period of reunification services because the second petition was close in time to the previous one and was based on the same conduct. The appellate court asserted that the agency's contention directly contradicts the statute; therefore, the juvenile court erred in denying the mother reunification services on this basis. The agency argued that the mother waived her right to challenge the denial of reunification services on appeal because her counsel submitted to the proposed finding that she had received the maximum amount of services to which she was entitled. The appellate court addressed the agency's argument by asserting that even if the right had been waived, the court had the discretion to hear the mother's challenge to the denial of reunification services because it is a question of law. The appellate court emphasized that when the mother submitted to the waiver, she was only acquiescing as to the state of the evidence and had preserved the right to challenge the evidence as insufficient to support a legal conclusion.
The court concluded that the mother was not precluded from receiving reunification services solely because she received 18 months of services in a previous dependency proceeding. According to the appellate court, section 361.5(a) clearly directs the juvenile court to order services "whenever" the child is removed from parental custody unless the case falls within the enumerated exceptions in the statute. The court acknowledged that the mother arguably falls within the section 361.5(b)(13) exception for having a history of "extensive, abusive, and chronic" drug use; however, the court indicated that the juvenile court did not make the required findings and the evidence of resumed drug use was not strong enough to make a "clear and convincing" finding as a matter of law. The appellate court concluded that none of the statutory exceptions authorized the denial of services based on a previous dependency where reunification was unsuccessful. The court stated, "Where jurisdiction has been terminated, however, the parent-child relationship is restored to its former status, free from governmental interference absent extraordinary circumstances, and a new dependency proceeding must include all the statutory provisions designed to protect that relationship." The appellate court issued a writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate its dispositional orders precluding the mother from reunification services and hold a new dispositional hearing.