Dependency Case Law

Teresa J. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (Sept. 24, 2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 366 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 506]. Court of Appeal, Third District.

The juvenile court had held that a dependent child could be relinquished only to a public adoption agency and declared that the relinquishment of the minor by his birth mother to a private adoption agency was invalid.
The minor had been adjudged a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Thereafter, his mother executed a statement of understanding and relinquished him to a private adoption agency for adoption. The statement of understanding named a couple who had previously cared for the child as his foster parents. The California Department of Social Services (DSS) signed an acknowledgement and receipt of the relinquishment. Soon thereafter, DSS declared the acknowledgment of relinquishment void because it did not comply with section 361(b), which DSS interpreted to mean that a parent could relinquish a dependent child only to DSS or a licensed county adoption agency, not a private adoption agency. The juvenile court agreed with DSS's interpretation and ruled that the relinquishment was invalid. On appeal, the birth mother and prospective adoptive parents contended that the birth mother had the right to relinquish the child to a private adoptive agency under Family Code section 8700 (a), which provides in part: "Either birth parent may relinquish a child to the department or a licensed adoption agency for adoption by a written statement signed before two subscribing witnesses and acknowledged before an authorized official of the department or agency." Under Family Code section 8350, a "licensed adoption agency" means both a licensed county adoption agency and a licensed private adoption agency. Because no distinction is made between a public and a private adoption agency, they contended that the birth mother could relinquish her child to either.

The Court of Appeal held that a birth parent could relinquish a dependent child to a private adoption agency, subject to the juvenile court's power to limit the parent's control over the child. Section 361 (b) provides: "Nothing in subdivision (a) shall be construed to limit the ability of a parent to voluntarily relinquish his or her child to the State Department of Social Services or to a licensed county adoption agency at any time while the child is a dependent child of the juvenile court if the department or agency is willing to accept the relinquishment." After reading section 361 as a whole, the court determined that subdivision (b) did not address the parent's ability to relinquish a dependent child to a private adoption agency. Subdivision (a) stated that when a child has been adjudged a dependent, "the court may limit the control to be exercised by any parent or guardian." The appellate court determined that section 361(b) does not limit the parent's ability to relinquish a dependent child for adoption but rather limits the juvenile court's ability to interfere with that decision when the relinquishment is to a public adoption agency. Moreover, the court found that the use of the term "licensed adoption agency" in Family Code section 8700 as well as the use of the term "adoption agency" in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 358.1 and 366.23 (e)(1) also supported a finding that the dependent child could be relinquished to both public and private adoption agencies.

However, the appellate court also noted that section 361(a) confers the juvenile court with broad power to limit the parent's control, which includes the parent's ability to relinquish the child to a private adoption agency since no exception exists in the subdivision. The appellate court explained that the juvenile court should have declared the relinquishment invalid as a result of the exercise of its power under section 361(a) and a finding that the relinquishment was not in the minor's best interest, rather than declaring the relinquishment itself invalid. The juvenile court's decision was therefore reversed and the matter remanded to determine whether the birth mother's control over the minor should be limited to preclude a relinquishment to the private adoption agency under the provisions of section 361(a).