Dependency Case Law

In re Megan P. (Sept. 25, 2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 480 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 425]. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1.

The juvenile court denied a father's request for a continuance, found that the father had received sufficient notice of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, noted that he was only an alleged father, and terminated his parental rights.

Following the mother's arrest in late 1996, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition alleging that she was unable to care for her children. The petition further stated that the whereabouts of the girls' father (whose name was misspelled) were unknown and that he was not providing them with regular care. As a result, the four girls were placed in foster homes. The father, however, had been trying to contact the children's mother but was unable to find her. He had moved from California to Indiana following his breakup with the mother. That same year, when the Los Angeles Child Support Services Department located him at his Indiana address and demanded that he pay child support, he readily admitted that he was the girls' father and began making child support payments.

DCFS, however, was not as successful in its attempts to search for the father. Despite a report from the mother's aunt that he was living in Indiana, DCFS searched for the father only in California, at the address where he had previously lived with the family. DCFS was also using a misspelled last name in its search even though the correct spelling was listed in the birth certificates of the two youngest daughters. In 1998, when the dependency court realized the spelling error, DCFS continued to search for the father only in California.

Although Child Support Services is a sister agency to DCFS, DCFS did not contact the department until March 2001 to inquire about the father's location. Child Support Services provided the father's Indiana address, and DCFS wrote to the father and requested that he call to discuss his plans for his children. The father called immediately, explaining that he had tried unsuccessfully to find his children and had believed that they were living with their mother. However, by this point, the oldest daughter had been placed in a group home and the other three were living with prospective adoptive families. His parental rights had already been terminated with regard to his two youngest daughters, and a hearing was set for January 2002 to terminate his rights as to his third daughter. A lawyer was appointed to represent the father in December 2001.

At the January 2002 hearing, the father's lawyer asked for a continuance, explaining that he had not had an opportunity to consult with his client. The request was denied and the father's rights were terminated. The juvenile court relied in part on the fact that he was not listed as the father on the birth certificates of his two oldest daughters (which was discovered sometime after 1999). However, he hadalways believed that he was the father of all of the girls and was engaged in a relationship with the mother when the two oldest girls were born. He appealed and also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming he had had no notice of the proceedings. DCFS contended that its search was legally sufficient and recommended termination of the father's parental rights so that his third daughter could be adopted.

The Court of Appeal reversed the order terminating the father's parental rights and remanded the case with directions to (1) vacate the disposition orders as to his third child and conduct the proceedings anew after providing the father with proper notice and an opportunity to be heard; (2) determine the father's status via his oldest daughter and, if it wa in her best interest, authorize visitation; and (3) order DCFS to provide all appropriate reunification services to the father. The petition for habeus corpus was granted to the extent necessary to vest jurisdiction in the dependency court to make the appropriate orders with regard to his two oldest daughters. The court stated that DCFS had a constitutional obligation to exercise due diligence to notify parents before terminating their parental rights. The term "reasonable diligence" denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and an inquiry conducted in good faith. (In re Arlyne A. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 591, 598-600.) The court concluded that the department had not exercised reasonable diligence by continuing to look for the father in California even though it had evidence of the correct spelling of his last name and his location in Indiana. Moreover, the court questioned why DCFS did not ask the Child Support Services Department whether it knew of the father's whereabouts. The appellate court noted that the father was entitled to be heard to try to demonstrate to the court that it was in his daughter's best interest to get to know him. The appellate court also indicated that dependent families are entitled to assurance that DCFS will take steps to contact and continue to contact the Child Support Services Department whenever a parent is missing.