Dependency Case Law

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court of Los Angeles and Terrell R. (Sept. 30, 2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 627 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 637]. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5.

The juvenile court denied the county's motion for summary judgment when a child alleged that the county breached mandatory duties and caused him injury by placing him in a foster home where he was sexually abused.

The child and his four siblings were adjudged dependents and removed from the custody of their mother. They were placed in the custody of their maternal grandmother and her husband until the County Department of Family Services removed the children because she failured to provide for them and abused prescription drugs. Thereafter the child was separated from his siblings and placed in a foster home with a family friend who had recently become a certified foster parent by attending the required training through a state licensed foster family agency. However, prior to certification, the foster parent had received only 15 of the 30 hours required to complete the training, of which fact the county social worker was aware.

The child lived with the foster parent for approximately three months. During that time, the county social worker visited once a month and the social worker from the foster family agency visited twice a month to assess the child's living environment. The child had his own room and appeared to be content. However, it was later discovered that the foster parent had been sleeping in the same bed as the child and sexually molesting him. The child was immediately removed from the home.

The child thereafter brought a lawsuit against the county, among other parties, alleging that pursuant to Government Code section 815.6, the County was directly liable for violating the mandatory statutory duties outlined in Family Code section 7950(a)(1); Welfare and Institutions Code sections 16501(c), 16501.1(c), 16000, and 16002(b); and State Department of Social Services Manual of Policies and Procedures (DSS Manual) regulations 31-301.21, 31-405.1(j), 31-420.1, and 31-420.2. He further alleged that the county was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligence of its social worker in its placement of the child and supervision thereafter. The county moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from suit unless it had breached a mandatory statutory duty and claimed that it had not. The county also moved for summary judgment on the ground that any negligence of its employees had been the result of their exercise of discretion, and as such the county was exempt from liability. The juvenile court held that a triable issue of fact existed regarding whether the county social worker had known that 30 hours of training was required prior to foster parent certification and that the foster parent had completed only 15 hours. The court reasoned that if the county social worker had known that the foster parent's certification was a sham, the county could be held liable for the social worker's breach of his ministerial duty to place the child in a certified foster home.

The Court of Appeal concluded that no triable issue of fact existed regarding any breach of mandatory duties by the county. The appellate court further concluded that the social worker and the county were immune from liability for the discretionary acts of the social worker in placing and supervising the child.

Pursuant to Government Code section 815.6, a public entity may be held directly liable for failing to fulfill a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment such as a statute or regulation. The following three factors must be present for liability to be imposed: (1) the enactment must impose a mandatory, not discretionary, duty; (2) the enactment must intend to protect against the kind of injury suffered by the party asserting section 815.6 as a basis of liability; and (3) the injury suffered must be proximately caused by the breach of such a duty. Whether an enactment is intended to impose a mandatory duty is a question of law for the court.

The child first contended that the county had a mandatory duty to place a foster child with a relative and siblings pursuant to the following statutes: Family Code section 7950(a)(1); Welfare and Institutions Code sections 16501.1(c), 16000, and 16002(b); and DSS Manual regulation 31-4202. Although the appellate court dealt with each statute separately, the result was the same: each conferred on social services agencies the discretion to choose an appropriate placement for the child under the circumstances. Placing the child with relatives and/or siblings was merely a "priority" for the social worker assigned to the case to consider in determining what foster-care placement was appropriate. No mandatory duty was created by any of the aforementioned statutes under which the county could be held liable. The appellate court also noted that the purpose behind most of the statutes was to preserve the family relationship and not to prevent sexual abuse. Further, the evidence was undisputed that, at the time of the child's foster placement, there was no placement available that would house all five siblings and none of the child's relatives was available for placement. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that since there was no mandatory duty to place the child with a relative and/or siblings, and there was evidence that neither the child's relatives nor siblings were available for placement, the county was not directly liable for placing the child in a foster home where he was sexually abused.

The child next contended that the county had a mandatory duty to place a foster child in an appropriate environment and monitor the child's condition under DSS Manual regulations 31-405.1(j) and 31-420.1. The appellate court concluded that placement and supervision are functions involving the exercise of discretion. The regulations set forth general policy goals for the social worker rather than created a mandatory duty. The appellate court emphasized that a county is not the insurer of a child's physical and emotional condition, growth, and development while in foster care placement.

Last, the child alleged that Welfare and Institutions Code section 16501 (c) and DSS Manual regulation 31-301.21 were sources of mandatory duties, but the appellate court was unable to discern any as both involved limitations on contracting for service-funded activities, needs assessment, and case management services.

The appellate court also addressed whether the county could be held derivatively liable for the social worker's placement and supervision of the child. In addition to direct liability, a public entity may be held derivatively liable for the tortious acts or omissions of its employees unless the employee himself or herself would be immune. (Gov. Code, § 815.2.) Pursuant to Government Code section 820.2, a public employee is immune from liability "where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused." Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the appropriate degree of supervision of a foster parent is a uniquely discretionary activity for which the county social worker and the county are immune from liability. It noted that the social worker had placed the child with a licensed foster family agency and complied with the visitation schedule mandated by regulations. During such visits, the child appeared to be content and never disclosed any episodes of sexual abuse. Therefore, since the social worker was immune from liability regarding the inherently discretionary nature of placing and supervising the child, the county could not be held derivatively liable for the acts of the social worker.

The last issue addressed by the appellate court was whether the county social worker had complied with her ministerial duty to place the child with a licensed foster family agency for placement in a certified foster family home since the social worker had known that the foster parent had not completed the requisite amount of training. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.21 (e)(6); DSS Manual Reg. § 31-420.22.) The appellate court held that the social worker had complied with her duty. It noted that she had placed the child with a licensed foster family agency and that the agency had certified the foster parent's residence as meeting the requirements of a proper foster family home. There was no evidence of improper purpose or motivation. The appellate court did not feel that mere knowledge that the agency relaxed training requirements for the foster parent could support the juvenile court's inference that she had known that the certification was a "sham." Therefore, the court determined that the social worker had fulfilled her duty under the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal granted the county's petition for writ of mandate and ordered the juvenile court to vacate its decision denying the county's motion for summary judgment and to enter judgment in favor of the county.