Dependency Case Law

In re Catherine H. (Oct. 18, 2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1284 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 342]. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2.

The juvenile court held that the child’s mother did not have standing to set a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing and declared the child a dependent of the court, formally removing the child from her guardian’s custody and selecting long-term foster care as the child’s permanent plan. Because the child’s mother suffered from mental illness, the child and her sister were placed under the guardianship of the child’s grandmother. The grandmother neglected the children by leaving them home overnight without any supervision. The San Bernardino County Department of Children Services (the department) filed a dependency petition in juvenile court, alleging that the grandmother failed to supervise or protect the child. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court allowed the grandmother to have unsupervised visitation and allowed the mother to have supervised visitation. The grandmother filed a written waiver of reunification of services, which was accepted by the juvenile court. The mother’s counsel announced that the mother was seeking custody of the child and asked the juvenile court to set a contested hearing. The juvenile court ruled that the mother did not have standing to set a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, arguing that the mother’s correct course of action would be to file a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. The juvenile court found the allegations of the department’s petition to be true, declared the child a dependent, and selected a long-term foster care plan for the child. The mother appealed the juvenile court’s decision, arguing that the court had erred by denying her request for a contested hearing which she was entitled to under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the jurisdictional provisions of the juvenile court’s order, including the finding that the allegations of the petition were true and the declaration of the child as a dependent child of the court. However, the appellate court reversed the dispositional provisions of the juvenile court’s order, including the findings that there was no previously noncustodial parent who desired custody, that the child’s placement was appropriate and necessary, and that long-term foster care was the appropriate permanent plan. On remand, the appellate court directed the juvenile court to hold a new dispositional hearing and to allow the mother, through her counsel, to appear, to be heard, and to present timely and appropriate evidence at that hearing. The appellate court reasoned that Welfare and Institutions Code sections 361.2(a), 302(b), 332(e), 335(a), 349, and 358 all indicate that a noncustodial parent has both the right to be present and the right to offer evidence at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings. The appellate court stated that generally, under section 361.2(a), when a juvenile court removes a child from a parent or guardian’s custody, it must consider placing that child with any noncustodial parent who so requests; therefore, the appellate court did not reach the issue of the applicability of section 366.3, upon which the mother based her contentions. Furthermore, the appellate court argued that denying a parent’s request for a contested review hearing could potentially violate the Constitution’s due process requirements. Thus, the appellate court held that a noncustodial parent seeking custody after his or her child has been removed from the custody of a predependency guardian has standing to request a contested dispositional hearing and, when the hearing is held, the right to appear, to be heard, and to present evidence. The appellate court concluded that the juvenile court erred prejudicially by denying the mother’s request for a contested dispositional hearing on the ground that she lacked standing. The appellate court stated that even if there were no standing in the court below, the parent would have been so aggrieved by the ruling that she would still have standing to pursue her claim on appeal.