Dependency Case Law

In re Megan S. (Dec. 11, 2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 876]. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1.

The juvenile court terminated parental rights of both parents under to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the agency) removed the four-year-old child from her parents’ custody and filed a section 300 petition on her behalf. The agency alleged that the mother’s substance abuse problems rendered her unable to care for the child and noted that the child had severe untreated dental decay. At the time of removal, the parents had three other children. The oldest, an 18-year-old girl, was caring for her younger two siblings, ages 13 and 11. The juvenile court ordered reunification services and placed the child with the mother of the oldest sister’s boyfriend. At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing. At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found the child adoptable and terminated parental rights after determining that none of the exceptions to termination of parental rights applied. On appeal, the parents and child contended that the relationship established between the child and her oldest sister warranted application of the section 366.26(c)(1)(E) exception and compelled reversal of the juvenile court’s order.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of parental rights after concluding that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the section 366.26(c)(1)(E) exception did not apply. Section 366.26(c)(1)(E) provides an exception to termination of parental rights if doing so would substantially interfere with the child’s sibling relationship. The burden is on the party to establish that severing the sibling relationship would cause detriment to the child. The appellate court determined that, while it was obvious that the child and her sibling were bonded, there was no evidence that the child would suffer detriment if the relationship were severed. Although both the social worker and the child’s therapist affirmed that the child had an interest in maintaining a relationship with her older sister, neither believed that termination of the relationship would traumatize the child. The appellate court further noted that, even assuming that the child would suffer detriment if separated from her sister, the juvenile court could still terminate parental rights if it determined that the child would benefit more from adoption than from maintaining the sibling relationship. The evidence demonstrated that the child’s interest in a permanent placement “greatly” outweighed the quality of her relationship with her sister. Moreover, the juvenile court was concerned that the sister did not have a beneficial relationship with the child and believed that she had bad judgment. The juvenile court appropriately examined evidence that the sister had alienated the child’s current caretaker, had allowed the child to stay overnight with her parents, was involved with a man with a criminal history, fought and swore with her boyfriend in front of the child, and occasionally had negative interactions with the child during their visits.

The parties also pointed out that application of section 366.26(c)(1)(E) did not preclude terminating parental rights at a later date, which the appellate court interpreted as an attempt to delay the adoption until the oldest sister was able to adopt the child. The appellate court, however, found that waiting would not be in the child’s best interest because it could permanently foreclose her chances of being adopted. It noted that the child was six and one-half years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing. There were 50 families who were willing to adopt her, 25 of whom would allow sibling contact. The social worker wished to place the child in such a home. Consequently, there would be no substantial interference with the sibling relationship. Although the parties claimed that there was no guarantee that sibling contact would be continued after adoption, the appellate court noted that such a possibility was irrelevant since the weight of the evidence still demonstrated that it was more important to give the child a stable parental relationship than to preserve the relationship with her sister. Therefore, it concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the section 366.26(c)(1)(E) exception did not apply.