Dependency Case Law

In re Holly H. (Dec. 31, 2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1324 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 907]. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3.

The juvenile court vacated the dependency proceedings and dismissed the petition when the child reached 19 years of age.

When the child was three years old, the Contra Costa County Social Services Department (department) filed a dependency petition alleging drug abuse and neglect by her mother. Her father was already deceased. The juvenile court adopted a plan for her paternal grandparents to become her legal guardians, but the plan was later changed to long-term foster care for financial reasons. When the child was 13, her grandmother became too ill to care for her and she was moved to a group home.

The child turned 18 in February 2001. In March 2001, she was diagnosed with lupus and kidney disease. In June 2001, she began receiving social security benefits because her father had died before she was 18 and she had moved out of the foster home. By January 2002, these payments had been discontinued.

A hearing was scheduled to review the child's dependency status. Prior to the hearing, the department filed a report and recommended that the petition be dismissed. The report noted that the child's application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits had been closed, possibly because she had failed to appear for evaluation. The report also stated that the department had secured her birth certificate, her social security card, and a California identification card when she left her foster home. She was currently living with her friend's mother.

Although the child did not appear at the review hearing, her social worker testified that she was not utilizing the services offered to her. The trial judge continued the hearing with the request that the child's attorney invite her to the next hearing to determine whether she needed continued services. Prior to the continued hearing date, the department filed an addendum to its report, noting that the child had graduated from high school; that she was currently living with her boyfriend; that she was receiving some assistance through the Sacramento County Independent Living Skills program, which would be available to her until she turned 21; and that the department had helped her apply for SSI benefits and had offered housing, educational, and employment assistance. The social worker recommended that the juvenile court vacate dependency and dismiss the petition.

Although the child was notified of the date of the continued hearing, she chose not to appear. Her counsel appeared on her behalf and argued that there was a "continuing risk of harm" to her since her social security benefits had been discontinued, she was not employed, and her SSI benefits application had not been processed. While the juvenile court appreciated such concerns, it concluded that the department had fulfilled its duties under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 39, and vacated the dependency and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the child argued that the court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition since there was evidence that she still needed the supervision, care, and protection of the juvenile court.

The Court of Appeal held that dependency jurisdiction should be retained by the juvenile court beyond a dependent's 18th birthday only when there is an existing or reasonably foreseeable threat of harm to the child. (See In re Robert L. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 789 (Robert L.).) Under section 303, the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a dependent child until the child attains the age of 21. However, the dependency petition may be dismissed at any time before the child reaches 21 "if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor require the dismissal, and that the parent or guardian of the minor is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation." (§ 390.) Section 391 requires the county welfare department to perform various services before jurisdiction is terminated over a child who has reached majority. If the required services have been offered, and the child has either refused the services or cannot be located through reasonable efforts, the juvenile court may terminate jurisdiction. (Ibid.) Even if all the required services have been provided, the juvenile court has discretion to continue jurisdiction for other reasons. (Ibid.)

Although decided prior to the enactment of section 391, Robert L., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 789, is the only reported decision to date addressing the standard in determining whether to terminate jurisdiction over a dependent child between the ages of 18 and 21 years. Robert, who was a 20-year-old college student, wanted to continue his dependency to help defray education and living expenses. The Court of Appeal, relying on section 300.2, concluded that Robert did not face existing or reasonably foreseeable future harm within the meaning of section 300.2 simply because he might not be able to afford to complete his college education, and terminated jurisdiction. In determining the applicable standard, the appellate court looked to section 300.2, which provides that the purpose behind dependency laws is to ensure the safety and well-being of children who are being abused or neglected or are at risk of that harm. The court reasoned that in determining whether to terminate jurisdiction over a child in long-term foster care, the issue to be addressed is the best interest of the child. (Robert L., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 793.) Since "the exercise of jurisdiction must be based upon existing and reasonably foreseeable future harm to the welfare of the child[, s]imilar factors should come into play in determining whether jurisdiction should extend beyond the age of majority." (Id. at p. 794.)

In light of the decision in Robert L., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 789, the appellate court in the present case developed the following standard: In deciding whether to terminate jurisdiction over a child who has reached majority, the court must first determine whether the department has met its obligations under section 391. The court must then consider whether termination would give rise to an existing or reasonably foreseeable future harm to the young adult. If not, under Robert L., jurisdiction should be terminated. However, if there is a prospect of such harm, the court must decide whether retaining jurisdiction would ultimately serve the best interests of the child. But in evaluating the child's best interests, the court must also take into account that the person is no longer a minor and that his or her preferences are entitled to be treated like those of an adult. Applying this standard to the present case, the appellate court concluded that, while there was an evidenced need for continued assistance, the child had given every indication that she did not want the assistance of the juvenile dependency system. She had repeatedly refused to take advantage of services that had been offered to her, and given her age of majority, the juvenile court could not and should not force her to accept them. Therefore, the appellate court reasoned that the child's continued participation in the dependency system could not reasonably be expected to prevent any future harm. Further, the termination of the court's jurisdiction would not leave the child without access to services since former foster care recipients are entitled to additional services to assist in the transition to adulthood until they are 21. (42 U.S.C. § 677(a)(5).) Thus, the appellate court concluded that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the dependency.