Dependency Case Law

Taylor M. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Jan. 14, 2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 97 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 502]. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1.

The juvenile court dismissed the dependency petition under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.) without affording the child an evidentiary hearing or determining whether a protective issue remained.

The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the agency) filed a dependency petition alleging that the child's mother had tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine at the time of the child's birth. There were two alleged fathers. The mother and one of the alleged father's had already parented two children, but their parental rights had been terminated due to neglect and drug use. Those children were residing with the alleged father's mother, who was also the mother's stepmother (alleged father and mother were stepsiblings). It was later determined that he was the biological father of the newborn as well. Before the birth of the new child, the mother promised to give the child to her stepmother as well as to several couples. However, she subsequently contacted an adoption agency who arranged an adoption with a Canadian couple. The Canadian couple had hired an adoption agency in Texas to handle the adoption. Both the mother and the other alleged father signed relinquishments of their parental rights. Thereafter, at the detention hearing in California, a juvenile court referee detained the child in foster care under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b) and ordered paternity tests. The paternity tests revealed that the father who had parented the mother's two previous children was also the father of the newborn. Although he initially opposed the arranged adoption, wanting his mother to care for the child, the father eventually signed a relinquishment of parental rights. However, he subsequently expressed a desire to revoke his relinquishment. Both parents also signed agreements to submit to Texas jurisdiction.

At a special hearing set by the mother, the Canadian couple and Texas adoption agency moved to dismiss the dependency proceeding on the following grounds: (1) the relinquishments were valid and irrevocable, (2) a proceeding to terminate parental rights had been filed in Texas, (3) all requirements under Texas law for adoption had been met, and (4) the Texas adoption agency was prepared to take custody of the child immediately. After discussing the matter with the Texas court, the referee stated that he was exercising emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and decided that the Texas court would hear the relinquishment issue. The referee suspended the California dependency proceedings and continued the matter. The child's counsel requested that the court lift the stay of the dependency proceedings and set jurisdictional and dispositional hearings.

At a subsequent hearing, the referee stated that he would probably not dismiss the dependency case unless the relinquishment issue was resolved in the adoption agency's favor. The Texas adoption agency reported that a hearing on the father's motion to transfer the case from Texas to California had been set. The adoption agency renewed its motion to dismiss the dependency petition, joined by the Canadian couple and the mother. The father argued that dismissing the petition would be premature in view of the pending Texas proceedings and that there was still a protective issue. The agency submitted on the dismissal issue, noting that it was opposed to dismissal, but that in view of the relinquishments, there was technically no protective issue unless the father's relinquishment was declared invalid, and claimed that the parents lacked standing. The agency asked the referee to order the child released to the Texas adoption agency if he dismissed the petition. The child's counsel renewed her request to lift the stay of the dependency proceedings and set jurisdictional and dispositional hearings.

The referee denied the child's counsel's request, found there was no protective issue, dismissed the petition, and invoked UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction to place the child in the custody of the Texas adoption agency. The child's counsel asserted that the child had a right to a contested hearing before dismissal and alternatively asked for a stay of the dismissal order so she could file a writ petition. The referee denied the request. Counsel for the child then requested a rehearing, which was also denied. Counsel for the child then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the juvenile court's dismissal of her dependency petition. The Court of Appeal stayed the dismissal of the dependency petition until further order and directed the parties to respond to the petition. Soon thereafter, the Texas judge denied the father's motion to transfer the matter to California and held that his relinquishment was valid.

On appeal, the child contended she was denied due process because (1) the court dismissed the petition without notice, a hearing, and a statement of legal authority, and (2) the UCCJEA was inapplicable. The parents agreed with the child's position. The agency and the Texas adoption agency asserted that the dependency petition was properly denied, with the agency further arguing that the relinquishments rendered the child's writ petition moot.

As a preliminary issue, the Court of Appeal concluded that both the Canadian couple and the Texas adoption agency lacked the standing accorded parents and de facto parents. It noted that neither had a close relationship with the child that would allow the court to profit from hearing their views about the child's best interests. It further found that the biological parents' relinquishments of their parental rights were invalid.

In regard to the dependency petition, the appellate court concluded that the juvenile court erred by dismissing the dependency petition without affording the child an evidentiary hearing. All interested persons must be afforded the opportunity to object and be heard when a social services agency wishes to dismiss a dependency petition. Here, during the hearings that preceded the dismissal, the child's counsel objected to dismissal and requested that the court set a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Other than the biological parents' relinquishments of their parental rights, there was little information concerning whether a protective issue still existed. Therefore, dismissal was inconsistent with the juvenile court's duty to protect the child's welfare and act in the interests of justice. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 350(c).)

The appellate court further concluded that the juvenile court erred in dismissing the dependency petition rather than continuing the proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the biological parents had relinquished their parental rights to the child and that termination proceedings were initiated in Texas. Relying on Teresa J. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 366, the appellate court concluded that once a child becomes the subject of a dependency petition, the juvenile court must decide whether to limit the parents' right to relinquish the child based on what it is the child's best interest. The Legislature has recognized the importance of sibling and half-sibling relationships and has declared its goal to preserve existing family relationships and to empower families, including extended families, to care for their own children whenever possible. (Fam.Code, § 8714.5(a)(2).) The appellate court found that this goal was ignored when the referee prematurely dismissed the dependency petition because relinquishment would sever the child's ties to her biological family, including her two siblings. Moreover, the child's father had expressed his desire that the child be cared for by his mother and had sought to revoke his relinquishment.

The appellate court further noted that the Texas court lacked jurisdiction to accept both the relinquishments of parental rights and the agreements to submit to Texas jurisdiction since the referee's detainment of the child in foster care was a child custody determination under the UCCJEA. (Fam. Code, § 3402(c), (n).) Moreover, the California juvenile court had jurisdiction to make such a determination because California was the child's home state. (Fam. Code, §§ 3402(g), 3421(a)(1).) In fact, the detention order was made before the Texas court took any action whatsoever. Therefore, because the referee made a child custody determination in accordance with Family Code sections 3421 and 3423, the California juvenile court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination. (Fam. Code, § 3422(a).)

Finally, the appellate court concluded that the juvenile court erred in referring the issue of parental relinquishment of rights to a Texas court on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Although the parents agreed to submit to Texas jurisdiction, the child did not. To the extent that the referee concluded that Texas was a more convenient forum, it abused its discretion.

Therefore, the appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate its order dismissing the dependency petition and to hold a new hearing regarding whether the child's welfare and the interests of justice required dismissal of the dependency petition.