The juvenile court terminated parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.

The Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed dependency petitions concerning newborn twins based on allegations that their mother and father had committed lewd and lascivious acts on two of the children's half siblings. The minute order from the detention hearing stated that the mother was possibly of Native American heritage. Notice was sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) accompanied by a note stating that the mother was unable to provide any information regarding her family history or tribal affiliation. BIA returned the notice because it contained insufficient identifying tribal information. The juvenile court sustained the petition and denied reunification services. The twins were placed in the home of a relative who was willing to adopt them. The social worker recommended termination of parental rights and a plan of adoption.

The juvenile court addressed the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) at the section 366.26 hearing. The paternal grandmother, who was present at the hearing, said she was not enrolled in an Indian tribe, she did not know whether she or the father was eligible for membership, and she was not able to identify a particular tribe or nation. However, she also stated that the father may have Indian heritage because "where were [sic] from is that section … ." The father, who was present, did not comment on the paternal grandmother's claim regarding Indian heritage. The juvenile court adopted the recommendations of the social worker for termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption. It further stated that it had no reason to believe that the children were Indian children since there was no indication that either of their parents were within the parameters of ICWA. On appeal, the parents contended that the information provided by the paternal grandmother at the section 366.26 hearing was sufficient to trigger the notice requirements of ICWA with regard to the father's possible Indian heritage.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the paternal grandmother had failed to assert any information that would reasonably suggest that the children had any known Indian heritage and affirmed the order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights. In any involuntary proceeding in a state court where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, notice of the pending proceedings and of the right of intervention must be provided to the parent and the Indian child's tribe by registered mail with return receipt requested. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) The Indian status of the child need not be certain to invoke the notice requirement so long as the juvenile court knows or has reason to believe the child may be an Indian child. The circumstances under which a juvenile court has reason to believe that a child is an Indian child include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) any party to the case, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or public or private agency informs the court that the child is an Indian child; (2) any public or state-licensed agency involved in child protection services or family support discovers information that suggests that the child is an Indian child; (3) the child who is the subject of the proceedings gives the court reason to believe he or she is an Indian child; (4) the residence or the domicile of the child, his or her biological parents, or Indian custodian is known by the court to be a predominantly Indian community; (5) an officer of the court involved in the proceeding has knowledge that the child may be an Indian child. In applying these guidelines to the facts of the case, the appellate court made the following conclusions. First, relatives are not expressly included as a proper source of information regarding the child's Indian status. Second, the grandmother was not a party to the proceedings. Third, regardless of whether or not the grandmother was a proper source, she did not inform the court that the children were either members of a tribe or the biological children of tribal members and eligible for membership. The appellate court determined that the information provided by the grandmother—that the father may be part Indian—was not based on any known Indian ancestors, but rather on the vague assertion that "where were [sic] from is that section … ." Such information was too speculative to give the juvenile court any reason to believe that the children might be Indian children.

The parents further argued that notice to the BIA was required under rule 1439(e) of the California Rules of Court. Rule 1439(e) provides that when the box on a dependency petition is marked to indicate that a child "may be of Indian ancestry," but not that the child is, or may be an Indian child, notice of the proceedings to the BIA and further inquiry regarding the child's possible Indian heritage are required. However, the appellate court pointed out that the boxes indicating possible Indian ancestry were not marked on the children's dependency petitions, and the information provided by the grandmother was too indefinite to give the court reason to believe that the children could have Indian ancestry. Therefore, rule 1439(e) was inapplicable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the order terminating parental rights was affirmed.