Other Cases Affecting Children

People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206 [970 P.2d 409; 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835]. Supreme Court of California.

In the guilt phase of a bifurcated criminal case, the defendant was convicted of felony child abuse (Penal Code section 273a) for severely shaking his child. It was unclear from the verdict whether the defendant was found guilty for direct infliction of unjustifiable physical pain for shaking the infant or for being criminally negligent in dropping the infant. At the sentencing phase of the trial, the enhancement allegations of the statute were found true, and the defendant was sentenced for felony child abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that the defendant must have been convicted of shaking the baby because the prosecution’s case was not built upon criminal negligence in dropping the baby. More importantly, the appellate court found that in order for the defendant to be guilty of direct infliction of unjustifiable physical pain, the jury must have found that the defendant was at least criminally negligent. The appellate court found there was no evidence that defendant knew or should have known that great bodily injury or death is likely to result from shaking the baby. The court concluded that the jury could only have found the defendant possessed a general criminal intent to shake his baby with no actual or constructive knowledge of the consequences and that this was not enough for a felony conviction under the statute.

The Attorney General appealed and the California Supreme Court granted review. They found that when a defendant directly inflicts physical pain or mental suffering upon a child, the scienter requirement is general criminal intent. The court first parsed Penal Code section 273a(1) finding that it proscribes four separate branches of conduct. The first determination that must be made is which of the four branches of proscribed conduct is implicated. The court found the proscribed conduct implicated was direct infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering. The other remaining branches of proscribed conduct involve indirect abuse or child endangerment which, in a footnote, the court chose not to address. The court found that they had not previously addressed the issue of appropriate mens rea for direct infliction of abuse cases. The court distinguished this case from cases involving indirect abuse or endangerment, such as when a parent declines to seek necessary medical treatment for their child. (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 135). There the court found that the statute requires criminal negligence. The court found that when the proscribed act implicated is direct infliction of abuse, the circumstances are different. The court, in reviewing the history of the statute, found no Court of Appeal case besides this one that discusses mens rea for direct infliction of abuse or indicates that there is a requirement of criminal negligence. The only cases that discuss and require criminal negligence are those that involve indirect abuse or endangerment.

The court then found that the appropriate mens rea for child abuse when directly inflicted is general criminal intent. The court first found that the statute was most easily interpreted as requiring only general criminal intent because it proscribes an act without mention of intent to do something further. The court next looked at the similarity between this statute and Penal Code section 273d, corporal punishment. The court found that (1) the two statutes are related, (2) that corporal punishment is a general intent statute, and (3) that battery, a lesser included offense of corporal punishment, is a general intent statute.

The court found next that the mens rea element applies only to the proscribed act and not to the requirement that the act occur under circumstances that are likely to produce great bodily harm or injury. The court found that the statute does not require that the defendant have actual or constructive knowledge of the circumstances. The court reasoned that this is similar to the difference between theft and grand theft. A thief’s culpability is based on the value of the object that they are stealing regardless of whether or not they know the value of the object. Here, the defendant is culpable of a felony if he is found by the jury to have shaken the infant under circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury whether he was aware of those circumstance or not.

Finally, the court found that the "unjustifiably" language saves the statute from being one of strict liability.