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Other Cases Affecting Children

People v. Leng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 433]. Court of Appeal, Fifth District.

At sentencing in an adult criminal proceeding, a defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication enumerated in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) was not proved to be either serious or violent but was still counted as a "strike" under the three-strikes law. Under Penal Code section 667(d)(3), a prior juvenile adjudication can be counted as a strike if the offense is contained in section 707(b) or is defined as a serious or violent felony by Penal Code sections 667.5 or 1192.7. The defendant appealed, contending that the use of a nonserious, nonviolent juvenile adjudication as a second strike was contrary to the intent of the three-strikes law and therefore violated his right to equal protection.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the use of a nonserious, nonviolent juvenile adjudication as a second strike is contrary to the intent of the three-strikes law and is therefore a violation of equal protection. The court first determined that the appropriate standard of review was whether the classification (1) bears a close relation to the promotion of a compelling state interest, (2) is necessary to achieve the government’s goal, and (3) is narrowly drawn to achieve the goal by the least restrictive means possible. The court noted that the prosecution did not introduce evidence to prove that the prior adjudication was violent or serious and that had the prior adjudication been in adult court, the prosecution would have had to do so. Therefore, the court held that a juvenile adjudication under section 707(b) may constitute a strike only if it is a serious or violent offense as defined in Penal Code sections 667.5 or 1192.7. Since the prosecution had failed at trial to prove that the prior adjudication involved such an offense, the trial court’s finding needed to be reversed. The court also held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the prior-strike allegation.