Other Cases Affecting Children

In re Anthony J. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1326 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 783]. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3.

The juvenile court found a child guilty of his own lynching under Penal Code section 405a. The child was being arrested by the police and they were successful in handcuffing him. The child struggled with the police and began to yell to a gathering crowd for assistance. As result of his appeals for help, the crowd grew to about two to three hundred people who eventually rushed the police officers and freed the child. The child ran off, still in handcuffs. He now brings this appeal claiming that one can not be the victim of a lynching and guilty of a lynching at the same time.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the child and affirmed the juvenile court’s ruling. The appellate court found that the "lynching" statute clearly applied to this situation. Penal Code section 405a defines a lynching as the taking of any person from the custody of the police by means of riot. The court held that it was not necessary that the purpose of the riot be to exact vengeance upon the person being freed from custody. In order for it to be a lynching, the riot only need be aimed at freeing a person in the custody of the police. Here, the purpose of the riot was to free the child and thus it qualifies as a lynching under Penal Code section 405a. Under Penal Code section 405b, anyone who participates in a lynching may be punished for the lynching. Here, the court found that the child participated in the riot both verbally and physically and thus the court held that he was punishable under the lynching statute although he was the person freed from custody.

The court also disagreed with the child’s argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the statutory definition of lynching deviates from the normal definition of lynching. The court found that the legislature is free to define crimes and fix punishments as it sees fit limited only by the constitutional restriction against cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that the statutory definition was clear on its face and thus not vague.

Finally, the court disagreed that Penal Code section 4534, prohibiting willful assistance in the escape of a person in custody, worked to preclude the application of the lynching statutes in this case. Penal Code section 4534 prohibits any form of willful conduct that effects the escape of a person in custody and is a more general statute. The lynching statutes specifically prohibit riotous conduct aimed at freeing a person in custody. The court reasoned that riotous conduct creates a greater danger to the police and the public at large and therefore may be punished separately from other willful conduct effecting the escape of a person in custody. The court held that the preclusion argument failed.