Other Cases Affecting Children

People v. Anderson (1999) 77 Cal. App. 4th 368 [91Cal.Rptr.2d 563]. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3.

In an adult criminal proceeding, the defendant was convicted of felony child abuse under conditions likely to produce great bodily harm and death and second degree murder. The defendant, a chronic alcoholic, on two separate occasions delivered a baby unassisted and then attempted to conceal the birth. The first child, born in 1992, survived after being discovered days after it was born. The second child, born in 1995, died minutes after birth. The defendant left the1992 baby on her bed underneath a pile of clothing. The defendant’s housemate discovered the child and called the police. The child survived and the defendant voluntarily spoke with officers regarding the incident. The 1992 incident was later prosecuted in conjunction with the 1995 second-degree murder charge. In 1995 the defendant gave birth unassisted in her home bathroom. The defendant had noticed the next morning that the child was not breathing but nonetheless left the child in her bed for another day. After an argument with the defendant about the baby, the defendant’s mother found the dead child in a box in the trunk of the defendant’s car and called 911.

The defendant made the following claims on appeal: (1) the second-degree murder charge must be reversed because the prosecution failed to establish corpus delicti; (2) there was insufficient evidence to establish that the death of 1995 baby was caused by criminal agency; (3) the second-degree murder charge must be reversed based on insufficient evidence of malice; (4) the court committed prejudicial error by allowing the introduction of statements that the defendant contends were obtained in violation of her Miranda rights; and (5) the 15 percent limitation on worktime credit, pursuant to Penal Code section 2933.1, was unlawfully applied to the felony child abuse charge.

The Court of Appeal held that (1) the defendant could not argue the failure of the prosecution to establish corpus delicti for the first time on appeal; (2) there was sufficient evidence of criminal agency; (3) the second-degree murder verdict must be reduced to involuntary manslaughter based on insufficient evidence of malice; (4) the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when the defendant spoke with the police; and (5) the limitation on the defendant’s conduct credits, pursuant to Penal Code section 2933.1, was appropriately applied. Also, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s felony child abuse conviction for the 1992 incident.

The Court of Appeal determined that because the defendant failed to object to the prosecution’s failure to establish the corpus delicti at trial, she could not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. In accord with the decision of People v. Sally (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1621, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, the appellate court reasoned that a defendant cannot complain of improper admission of corpus delicti evidence if he or she has failed to specifically object to the evidence at trial. The Court of Appeal followed the rationale articulated by the Supreme Court in People v. Wright that the proof of corpus delicti evidence may have been available at trial and, in the absence of an objection, such proof is omitted. People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 404, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.

The defendant also contended that evidence of criminal agency was insufficient. She asserted that there was no showing that she could have obtained medical assistance or summon help for the one to two minutes the newborn was breathing. The appellate court, relying on People v. Chavez, found that the defendant had failed in her duty to provide care to her baby and that the evidence was sufficient to prove that infant’s death was caused by a criminal act. People v. Chavez (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 621, 176 P.2d 92. The baby in this case was capable of living for approximately 10 minutes. The defendant during that time period was physically capable of moving and could have summoned help from her parents in the next room or by using the telephone. The defendant failed to act with due caution and circumspection, thereby committing involuntary manslaughter, when she did not avail herself of assistance and did not provide essential medical care to the child.

The appellate court determined that there was insufficient evidence of malice aforethought, as required for a second-degree murder conviction, with respect to the 1995 baby’s death. Distinguishing the facts in the present case from those in People v. Burden, (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 603, 140 Cal.Rptr.282, the appellate court found that to imply malice from the failure of good judgment during the traumatic period of childbirth, in which the child had at most eight minutes to survive, would be speculative. In Burden, a father allowed a five-month-old child to starve to death because he didn’t care about the child. The appellate court noted that in acting with a probability of causing death, there is a difference between a parent who watches his or her child waste away over a period of weeks and a parent who has just given birth. The defendant’s inaction, in this case, did not rise to the level of a conscious disregard for human life as required to prove implied malice. The appellate court reversed the second-degree murder verdict and reduced the conviction to involuntary manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s decision that for Miranda purposes, the defendant’s statements to the police were made when the defendant was not in custody. The defendant, upon initial questioning at her home, agreed to speak with one of the detectives alone and was then given her Miranda rights. The appellate court noted that the defendant was not placed under arrest, her parents were home, there were no accusations made at this time, and the questions were preliminary in nature. The court determined that the detective’s conduct was not coercive. The defendant’s statement was correctly admitted by the trial court.

In addition, the defendant, by committing a Penal Code section 667.5 felony in 1995, was subject to Penal Code section 2933.1. Therefore, the trial court appropriately limited her worktime credit.