Other Cases Affecting Children

Troxel v. Granville (2000) ___ U.S. ___ [___S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed ___; 2000 WL 712807; 2000 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6377] United States Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme Court held that a Washington statute regarding court-ordered, nonparental visitation in custody matters was unconstitutional.

The Superior Court permitted a petition by two children's grandparents for visitation rights pursuant to Revised Code of Washington section 26.10.160(3) and ordered more visitation than the mother desired. The children's mother and father were never married. The father lived with his parents and the children regularly visited their grandparents. The father committed suicide and the children still saw their grandparents on a regular basis. Because the children's mother sought to limit their visitation rights, the grandparents petitioned the court under Revised Code of Washington section 26.10.160(3), which permits any person to petition for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The superior court ordered visitation for the grandparents one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on the grandparents' birthdays. The mother appealed the visitation order. The United States Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's visitation order, holding that the grandparents lacked standing to petition for visitation because there was no custody action pending. The Washington Supreme Court heard the grandparent's petition and determined that they had standing to seek visitation whether or not a custody action was pending. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appeals court, holding that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on the mother's fundamental right to raise her children. The court rested its decision on the determinations that the statute impermissibly permitted the state to interfere with the rights of parents to rear their children when there was no threat of harm or potential harm to the children, and that the statute was too broad in authorizing "any person" at "any time" to petition for visitation. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Washington Supreme Court, invalidating the nonparental visitation statute as unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor wrote the Court's main opinion joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. The liberty interest of parents in providing the care, custody, and control of their children has long been recognized as a fundamental right provided under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (See Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042; Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070; Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 888 L.Ed. 645.) The Washington nonparental visitation statute was declared "breathtakingly broad" by permitting any third person to petition the court for visitation without giving the parent's decision any presumption of validity or weight, thereby placing the best-interest determination solely with the judge. There was no special factor justifying the state's interference with the mother's fundamental right to rear her children and no determination that the mother was an unfit parent. The superior court wrongfully did not give any special weight to the mother's determination of what was best for her children. The burden was mistakenly placed on the fit custodial parent, the mother, to disprove that the grandparents' visitation would be in the best interest of her children. Therefore, the superior court contravened the presumption that a fit parent would act in the best interest of his or her children. The entry of the visitation order violated the Constitution, and the application of Revised Code of Washington section 26.10.160(3) violated the mother's right to make decisions for the care, custody, and control of her daughters. It was not necessary to remand the case for further proceedings.

Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, stating that the statute swept too broadly and was unconstitutional on its face. There is no need to decide whether harm is required for intervention with respect to visitation or to determine the precise scope of the parents' right to rear their children. Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment, stating that strict judicial scrutiny is applied when fundamental rights are infringed. He concluded that the State of Washington failed to meet the standard of a legitimate governmental interest in interfering with the fit mother's parental decision making.

Justice Stevens dissented, concluding that there was no need to review a state Supreme Court decision that merely required the Legislature to redraft the statute. Justice Stevens declared that the majority incorrectly concluded that a statute authorizing any person to petition for visitation rights would invariably violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The presumption that a parent's decisions generally serve the best interest of the child is well established, but even a fit parent is capable of treating a child as a mere possession. Justice Stevens warned against creating a constitutional rule that permits the biological parents' liberty interests (to the care, custody, and control of their children) to be isolated and exercised arbitrarily. Justice Scalia also dissented, articulating that the Court should be wary of judicially prescribing family law principles. State Legislatures, not federal judges, are in the best position to draft statutes and amend their mistakes. In Justice Kennedy's dissent, he observed that there are two different standards with respect to domestic relations' determinations: a harm-to-the -child standard and a best interest-standard. Court-ordered visitation is a 20th-century phenomenon and historically grandparents had no legal right of visitation. A general conclusion that third parties who seek visitation have no legitimate relationship with the child and that the nuclear family should establish the visitation standard for the child does not correlate with the prevailing structure of most existing households. A third party who has acted in a caregiving role over a significant period of time has developed a relationship with the child that should not necessarily be subjected to an absolute parental veto. The best-interest standard in all third-party cases should not be rejected as the Washington Supreme Court has held. The Washington Supreme Court wrongfully required the harm-to-the-child standard and therefore did not address the specific visitation order. He concluded that the case should be remanded to the state court for further proceedings.