Other Cases Affecting Children

The City and County of San Francisco v. Tijerino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 160 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d. 30]. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2.

The trial court set aside an order declaring that a father was the biological father of a child. Prior to the child's birth the father signed stipulated agreement that he was the father. The child was initially placed with the father, and six months later the child returned to the mother. The mother had a substance abuse problem and she called Child Protective Services when she was unable to care for the child any longer. The mother claimed to have no idea who the biological father was, and a paternity inquiry was sent to the Family Support Division. However, before the paternity judgment was disclosed, the juvenile court ordered blood tests revealing that the father was not the biological father. The father filed a motion to set aside the stipulated paternity Judgment. He argued that the stipulated agreement should be considered as a voluntary declaration of paternity under Family Code section 7575. The trial court set aside the paternity judgment and the county appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order setting aside the judgment of paternity, declaring, even though it was conceded, that the father was not the biological father. The trial court initially denied the motion to set aside the paternity judgment on the ground that Family Code section 7575 was inapplicable. When the father moved for reconsideration, the trial court relied on a then-recent holding that was ultimately depublished by the California Supreme Court and set aside the judgment. The father contended that because he presented new or different facts and circumstances, his motion for reconsideration was properly considered under the Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. The appellate court concluded that the father's showing on the motion for reconsideration did not meet the requirements under that section. There was insufficient evidence relating to the payment for blood testing and to court ordered blood testing, and the father also relied on a case that was not final. The appellate court also rejected the argument that the father could not obtain juvenile records because he was the legal father at the time. The trial court judge's decision "to do equity" by setting aside paternity judgment was improper because subsequent genetic testing is not sufficient to set aside a valid paternity judgment in the absence of extrinsic fraud.